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Abstract  
Previous work suggests that Medicaid eligibility expansions may lead to declines in labor market 
activity. This paper explores the related, but novel question of whether variation in Medicaid benefit 
generosity alters employment outcomes. We consider adult vision benefits as a case study. Our findings 
suggest that vision benefits have a net positive effect on intensive margin measures including hours 
worked and occupational skill requirements, but no significant effect on the likelihood of being 
employed. These results indicate that Medicaid’s effect on labor market activity is sensitive to the set of 
covered services.  
Keywords: Health insurance, Medicaid, Employment, Vision care. JEL codes: I13, I18, J22, H75 
 
*The majority of the work for this article was done while Brandy Lipton was employed by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality or the Department of Health and Human Services. This research was not 
sponsored and neither author has a conflict of interest to report.  
**Corresponding author: Brandy J. Lipton, Ph.D. Email: blipton@sdsu.edu 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The number of non-elderly adults enrolled in Medicaid has increased substantially over the last 
few decades, reaching 27 million in 2017 (Sommers & Grabowski 2017). As the number of working-age 
adults has increased, the effects the program has on labor market activity have grown in importance. 
Standard economic theory suggests that means-tested benefits will discourage employment by reducing 
the returns to work and imposing an implicit tax on earnings. On balance, previous research suggests 
small-to-moderate negative effects of program eligibility on any employment, hours worked, and 
earnings (a review of recent studies is available in Garrett and Kaestner (2014)). 
 In this paper, we examine a related, but novel question concerning Medicaid’s effect on 
employment. We consider whether the benefit package a state offers Medicaid enrollees influences labor 
market activity, using adult vision benefits as a case study. Vision screening and corrective lenses are 
meaningful services to consider given that half of all adults have a clinically important refractive error 
(Vitale et al. 2008). Although all states must offer vision screening and eyeglasses to children, states 
have the option of covering these services for adults (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014a). Not all states 
cover vision benefits and individual states have added and dropped these benefits over time. Vision 
benefits are likely to be valuable to beneficiaries given that the out-of-pocket cost for an optometrist 
visit and corrective lenses averages $382 for an uninsured person, approximately 37% of monthly 
income for a single adult living at the federal poverty line (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 2017).  
Previous work has found that Medicaid adult vision coverage increases the use of vision services and 
improves the rate of appropriately corrected distance vision by up to 10 percentage points (Lipton & 
Decker 2015; Lipton & Decker 2016). Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we build 
on that work by examining economic outcomes that could plausibly respond to increased access to 
vision services. 
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The effect of vision coverage on employment outcomes among adult Medicaid enrollees is 
theoretically ambiguous. Access to vision services could improve labor market prospects all else equal, 
both on the extensive employment margin and on the intensive margin (e.g., hours worked and 
occupation type). For example, correcting a refractive error could increase the number and type of jobs a 
beneficiary is qualified for, it could reduce barriers to transportation that limit the amount or type of 
work, or it could reduce the disutility of work by relieving the discomfort and strain that often 
accompanies uncorrected visual impairment. While there is little research on the causal effects of vision 
correction on human capital and economic outcomes, correlational studies have found that vision 
difficulty is associated with significant functional impairments that could disrupt employment (Swanson 
& McGwin 2004; Varma et al. 2006). Further, nearly 90% of visual impairments can be eliminated with 
corrective lenses (Vitale et al. 2006).  
 On the contrary, Medicaid adult vision benefits could discourage work activity by increasing the 
value of the program and its associated work disincentives. The addition of vision coverage could reduce 
reliance on an employer for vision benefits. Further, reduced out-of-pocket costs for vision services 
could, in theory, have an income effect.  
Our preferred empirical estimates of the effect of Medicaid adult vision coverage on employment 
outcomes come from a triple difference model. Our approach compares Medicaid enrollees to a control 
group of low-income adults who are not enrolled (first difference), in states with and without Medicaid 
adult vision coverage (second difference), and before and after changes in vision coverage policy (third 
difference). Since the control group should not be directly affected by Medicaid benefit generosity, the 
triple difference approach purges our estimates of unobserved time-varying state-level omitted variables 
that affect Medicaid enrollees and the control group similarly. An important assumption of this strategy 
is that vision benefits themselves do not induce enrollment in Medicaid. Otherwise, our results could be 
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biased by compositional effects. We test that assumption directly and find that offering vision coverage 
has no effect on Medicaid participation. This finding increases our confidence in the empirical design.    
Our results suggest that vision benefits have a net positive effect on labor market activity. While 
we do not find evidence of a significant effect on the extensive employment margin (employment in at 
least one week of the calendar year), we do find that Medicaid adult vision coverage is associated with a 
3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to working part time or 
not working, for Medicaid enrollees relative to the control group. Among the employed, vision coverage 
is associated with a 6.1 percent increase in usual hours worked per week (or about two additional weekly 
hours), a 5.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to part time, and 
a shift toward occupations that require higher levels of skill. All of these results are completely 
concentrated among Medicaid enrollees. The associations between Medicaid adult vision coverage and 
employment outcomes among the control group are in general small, non-significant, and often the 
opposite sign. We also examined whether the employment effects of vision benefits vary by subgroup. 
Our findings suggest that effects tend to be concentrated among women, but estimates do not vary 
substantially by age (under/over 35) or marital status.  
Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. For example, our conclusions are robust to 
direct controls for other important sources of Medicaid benefit generosity that could be correlated with 
vision benefits, namely per-person spending and adult dental benefits. Further, we conduct placebo 
checks, explore alternative control groups, conduct intent-to-treat analyses, estimate difference-in-
differences analyses with no within-state control group, relax our preferred sample inclusion 
requirements, and compare weighted and unweighted models. The outcome of these tests suggests that 
our main results are unlikely to be explained by competing hypotheses. 
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This paper contributes to several different strands of literature. First, we produce some of the 
first plausibly causal evidence on the effect of vision benefits (regardless of source) on labor market 
activity. Second, our results suggest that Medicaid’s effect on employment is sensitive to the set of 
services that the program covers. Finally, we complement a growing set of papers that suggest that 
Medicaid acts as an investment in health and economic well-being (Boudreaux, Golberstein, & 
McAlpine 2016; Brown, Kowalski, & Lurie, 2015; Cohodes et al. 2015; Goodman-Bacon 2016; Lipton 
et al. 2016; Miller & Wherry 2015; Wherry et al. 2015). Previous papers have shown that Medicaid 
coverage in childhood can improve outcomes over the long term. In this paper, we show that Medicaid 
coverage for adults can have shorter run economic payoffs. In this regard, our paper complements other 
studies, such as those on child care subsidies and the Earned Income Tax Credit, that show that public 
transfer programs can increase labor market activity under the right conditions (Herbst 2009; Grogger 
2003). Such findings may have important implications for designing means-tested benefit programs in 
ways that enable fuller labor force activity. 
The outline for the paper is as follows. The rest of Section 1 provides additional background on 
Medicaid and the literatures to which we contribute. Section 2 describes our data and methods. Section 3 
presents results, and Section 4 concludes. 
1.1. Background 
 Medicaid is a state-federal partnership that provides means-tested health insurance coverage to 
income eligible recipients in the U.S. Historically, the program was restricted to single-parent families 
receiving cash-welfare under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC), the low-
income elderly, and low-income people with a disability. Beginning in the 1980’s, the program was 
expanded to new categories of beneficiaries including low-income parents of dependent children and 
ultimately to childless non-elderly adults as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Buchmueller, Ham, 
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& Shore-Sheppard 2015). While states must extend Medicaid eligibility to parents and children who 
would have been eligible under the AFDC requirements of July 1996 (i.e., the final year of the AFDC 
program), covering parents above these thresholds and childless adults at any income level remains 
optional. Prior to implementation of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, many states opted to cover parents 
at income levels above those required by law, but childless adults were not eligible for Medicaid 
regardless of their income in many states. By 2005 (approximately the mid-point of our study period), 
the median income eligibility limit for parents was 67% of poverty with substantial heterogeneity across 
states (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014b). 
 While states are required to cover a set of essential services for all adult beneficiaries, other 
services are covered at the states’ option. These optional services constitute approximately 30% of 
program spending (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2005). While some optional 
services, such as prescription drugs, are covered by all states, other services such as dental and vision are 
only covered by a subset of states.   
In work using similar methods to ours and based on data from the National Health Interview 
Survey, Lipton and Decker (2015) found that Medicaid coverage for vision screening and corrective 
eyeglasses increased visits to the eye doctor by 17.5%. This estimate is smaller than the effect implied 
by the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which found that free care relative to cost-sharing increased 
the likelihood of visiting an eye doctor by 32% for poor adults (Lurie et al., 1989; Manning et al. 1987). 
Lipton and Decker (2015) also found significant reductions in self-reported vision impairment and 
vision-related functional limitations. A subsequent paper found that providing Medicaid adult vision 
benefits led to improvements in auto-refractor measured distance visual acuity using data from the 
National Health Examination and Nutrition Survey (Lipton & Decker 2016). The authors estimated an 
improvement of up to 10 percentage points in appropriately corrected distance vision, providing strong 
evidence of a first stage effect.  
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The finding that Medicaid adult vision benefits improve self-reported vision-related function and 
measured distance visual acuity raises the possibility that vision benefits might reduce work limitations 
that constrain labor supply. This effect could be particularly salient on the intensive margin given that 
Medicaid enrollees who do not work at all often have substantial disabilities or have familial 
responsibilities that completely prohibit labor force participation (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017a). 
Unfortunately, there is little previous evidence on the direct role that refractive error (and its correction) 
plays in economic outcomes. A small randomized trial conducted by Daum et al. (2004) found that 
experimentally manipulated astigmatic refractive error delayed time to completion on a set of standard 
computer tasks. Glewwe, West, and Lee (2014) used a randomized trial in Title I elementary schools in 
Florida to study the effect of providing free eye exams and eyeglasses. They find that providing both 
services improves 5th grade reading and math scores. This evidence is complementary to results from a 
large randomized control trial in China, though the results of this latter study suggested particularly large 
returns in the form of higher test scores equivalent to up to 0.9 additional years of schooling (Glewwe et 
al. 2016). Ours is one of the first studies, to our knowledge, to contribute plausibly causal evidence on 
the effect of vision coverage on labor supply.  
The majority of the literature examining Medicaid’s effects on the employment of non-disabled 
adults has focused on the role of eligibility rules. In theory, income-based eligibility rules create a 
disincentive for workers to increase hours and for non-workers to join the labor force because earnings 
above the threshold cause a loss of Medicaid benefits, whose cash-value can be substantial (Garrett & 
Kaestner 2014). The empirical literature on this topic has come to mixed conclusions. Early work found 
that those estimated to place a high value on Medicaid were less likely to leave the program and become 
employed (Moffitt & Wolfe, 1992). Yelowitz (1995) investigated the de-linking of cash-welfare and 
Medicaid for children that occurred in the early 1990’s on the labor supply of single-mothers with 
dependent children and found a small, but significant decline in employment. Later work by Ham and 
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Shore-Sheppard (2005) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) which used a slightly different 
parameterization failed to find any effect when studying the same expansions. Decker and Selck (2012) 
and Strumpf (2011) found no effect of the introduction of Medicaid in the late 1960’s on the labor 
supply decisions of single-mothers while Dave et al. (2015) found relatively substantial reductions in 
employment as the result of expansions to pregnant women that occurred in the mid-1980’s. 
Papers that have studied recent expansions to non-elderly and non-disabled adults are perhaps 
the most applicable to our work. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment found no significant change 
in employment as the result of randomly assigning Medicaid eligibility to a group of low-income 
childless adults (Baicker, Finkelstein, & Taubman 2014). By contrast, analysis of quasi-experimental 
data from Wisconsin (Dague, DeLeire, & Leninger 2016) and Tennessee (Garthwaite, Gross, & 
Notowidigdo 2014) suggest that changes to Medicaid eligibility can have relatively substantial 
employment effects among adults. Dague et al. (2016), using comprehensive administrative data, found 
that Wisconsin’s expansion to childless adults was associated with a two to ten percentage point decline 
in employment, depending on the model used. Garthwaite et al.’s (2014) CPS-based study of a large 
Medicaid disenrollment event in Tennessee suggested substantial employment effects (25%) that are 
somewhat unique in the literature. Other work has shown that the employment effects of recent 
eligibility expansions differ by subgroup. For example, Hamersma and Kim (2009) found that parental 
eligibility expansions reduced job-lock for unmarried women, but not for married women or for men. 
On balance, the existing literature suggests small-to-moderate negative effects of historical 
Medicaid eligibility expansions on employment outcomes, with results varying across time period and 
population. Evaluations of the most recent expansions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) have 
consistently failed to find evidence that the ACA Medicaid expansion has decreased labor market 
activity (Duggan, Goda, & Jackson 2017; Gooptu et al. 2016; Kaestner et al. 2017; Leung & Mas 2016; 
Moriya, Selden, & Simon 2016). The current study has important implications for the literature on 
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Medicaid and labor market outcomes. Rather than focusing on the effects of changes to eligibility rules, 
we examine whether there are non-eligibility dimensions of public health insurance that enable or 
depress labor activity.  
2. Data and Methods 
2.1. The Current Population Survey 
The Current Population Survey is a monthly household survey that serves as the main data 
source for U.S. labor force statistics. We used the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to 
the survey, which is conducted in the spring of each year and contains expanded labor force information 
in addition to questions about family income and insurance status. Our analysis used the 2002-2013 
survey years. We did not include 2014 and 2015 because the survey underwent a major redesign in 2014 
that affected how insurance coverage and income were reported (Medalia et al. 2014). 
Outcomes of interest included full-year employment status (employment in one or more weeks 
versus no employment in any week)1, full-time status (i.e., at least 35 hours per week), part-time status 
(i.e., fewer than 35 hours per week), usual hours worked, and hourly wages. We also examine changes 
in occupation type using an index of occupational skill from Autor (2013) that is defined as the mean log 
occupational wage for non-farming three-digit occupation categories. We consider the joint probability 
of being employed and working full time (respectively part time) for the full sample as well as the 
likelihood of working full time (vs. part time) among those who worked at least one week in the past 
year. Usual hours worked, hourly wages, and occupational skill are analyzed only for employed 
individuals. We constructed hourly wages by dividing total annual earned income, which was deflated 
using the consumer price index, by the product of usual hours worked and number of weeks worked in 
                                                 
1 Respondents were instructed to count weeks in which they worked for even a few hours.  
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the previous year. Observations where the nominal hourly wage was below the federal minimum for 
tipped employees ($2.13 during our entire study period) were excluded from our analysis of wages given 
previous literature suggesting a high degree of measurement error for incomes at the bottom of the 
distribution (Meyer & Sullivan 2003).2 
The reference year for the income and health insurance questions as well as for all of the 
outcomes used in our analysis is the previous calendar year (i.e., 2001-2012).  
2.2. State Coverage Policies 
As described  in Lipton and Decker (2015) and Lipton and Decker (2016), we used annual 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) reports based on a 50-state survey combined with vision coverage 
information available on the KFF website to determine Medicaid adult vision coverage policies for each 
state and year (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014a). We used coverage policies applicable to non-elderly 
adult enrollees who were not pregnant or disabled. While benefit coverage policies are often consistent 
across eligibility categories, benefits can differ for adults eligible due to pregnancy (typically benefits 
are more generous) or disability. Further, states may provide a different benefit package to adults 
eligible through an 1115 waiver program. In instances where most low-income adults were included in 
the waiver population, we used coverage policies applicable to that group. Except for states with no 
Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) component (e.g., Tennessee), our vision coverage policies represent 
those applicable to FFS enrollees.3 We used exact dates of policy changes whenever possible, and 
                                                 
2 We include these low wage workers in outcomes whose measurement is not dependent on earnings in 
order to maximize sample size. However, excluding them has no effect on the results of other outcomes.  
3 Managed care plans may choose to provide benefits that fee-for-service enrollees do not receive such 
as eye exams and eyeglasses. However, we chose to use FFS policies in all states to be consistent. When 
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otherwise assumed that the change occurred at the beginning or mid-point of the appropriate state fiscal 
year, depending on when the change was reported. To supplement the information available from KFF, 
we searched state Medicaid websites and news articles and contacted state health departments to resolve 
discrepancies.    
We classified state coverage policies as coverage of a preventive eye exam and eyeglasses for 
correction of refractive error compared to coverage of an exam only or no coverage for either service 
because eyeglasses constitute the majority of the costs of refraction (Vitale et al. 2006). Most states that 
provide coverage of exams also cover eyeglasses, with only a small number of states covering an exam 
only and no states covering eyeglasses, but not exams during our period of analysis. We defined a binary 
coverage variable equal to one for respondents residing in states that offered coverage of both an exam 
and eyeglasses for at least six months of the reference calendar year and zero otherwise. Because we 
expected that gaining or losing vision coverage would first affect use of eye care with any potential 
impacts on labor market decisions occurring with a lag, our main analysis used a version of this 
coverage variable lagged by one year. (For results using concurrent coverage, Appendix Table 3.)  
This coverage indicator provides an estimate of the effects of Medicaid adult vision coverage, 
averaged across programs with different features. For example, states that cover exams and eyeglasses 
may differ in how often enrollees can receive new eyeglasses, whether a minimum diopter correction is 
required, and whether coverage is first dollar or there is a copayment or dispensing fee, among other 
aspects of coverage generosity (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014a). Though information is not available 
in all years, data collected by KFF suggest that the majority of states with an adult vision benefit cover 
exams and eyeglasses replacement every one or two years, with a handful of states covering eyeglasses 
                                                 
comparing FFS vision coverage policies to those for the main managed care provider in each state in 
2012, we found that coverage was consistent in all but two cases. 
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replacement every three to five years.4 Most states required a minimum diopter correction to cover new 
eyeglasses, and many states charged a small copayment or dispensing fee, typically between $1 and $3, 
for exams and eyeglasses. 
While states both added and dropped vision coverage over our study period, more states dropped 
than added coverage. In particular, 34 states provided coverage according to our definition (coverage of 
both an exam and glasses) in 2001 compared to 26 states in 2012. Between 2001 and 2012, 14 states 
changed vision coverage policy. Figure 1 provides a detailed timeline of these changes. Because of our 
definition of coverage, which requires that a state cover exams and eyeglasses for at least six months of 
the year, and the fact that we used lagged vision coverage policies, 10 states contributed to identification 
of the effects of vision coverage in our main analysis (i.e., California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Utah). These 10 states represented 45% of adult 
Medicaid beneficiaries in 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2017b). 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of Medicaid enrollees with vision coverage in each year of our 
study period, and demonstrates that coverage declined over time, though not monotonically. About 76 
percent of enrollees had coverage in 2001, according to our definition. This figure declined by about ten 
percentage points between 2001 and 2005, increased between 2005 and 2008, and then declined 
dramatically after 2009. By 2012, only about 50 percent of enrollees had vision coverage. While many 
states changed their vision coverage policies prior to 2008, including some large states, the most 
substantial change in the percentage of enrollees with vision coverage coincided with the Great 
Recession. This graph demonstrates the likely sensitivity of optional Medicaid benefits to macro-
                                                 
4 Maine covered only one pair of eyeglasses per lifetime, which we considered as not providing 
coverage. 
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economic conditions, an issue we address in a few ways, including (but not limited to) directly 
controlling for local economic conditions in our regression models.  
2.3. Empirical Approach 
We first conduct an exploratory analysis of whether a state’s decision to offer vision coverage 
has a direct impact on enrollment in Medicaid among low-income adults. This parameter is of interest in 
isolation, however, finding an effect would have cast doubt on the analytical strategy we use to answer 
our main research question. As described in more detail below, our main research question is addressed 
using a triple difference (DDD) approach that relies on Medicaid status to identify the treated sample. 
Our results could be biased if enrollment in Medicaid is systematically correlated with state vision 
coverage policies. We might observe a correlation for a few reasons. More generous coverage could 
induce higher participation in Medicaid among eligible adults. On the contrary, vision benefits could 
decrease Medicaid participation if they enable increased earnings or switches to jobs with coverage 
benefits. Finally, it is also possible that enrollment could change at the same time as changes to vision 
coverage policies for other reasons (i.e., if eligibility changes occur around the same time as vision 
coverage policy changes). The main concern in terms of estimate bias is that the marginal person that 
enrolls due to a change in vision coverage policy could have a different propensity to be employed or to 
work full time compared to the average enrollee.  
While separating the effects of vision coverage from compositional changes would be difficult, 
we conduct the more direct test of whether vision coverage policies are correlated with the likelihood 
that a low-income adult participates in Medicaid using a difference-in-differences design. Our approach 
accounts for time invariant state-level characteristics that could be correlated with both vision coverage 
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policies and Medicaid enrollment and national trends in enrollment. 5 We estimate models with and 
without controls for a set of important time varying state-level characteristics and state-specific linear 
time trends. The most comprehensive regression takes the following form: 
(1)  Medicaid𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1Vision𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2X𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝑡 × 𝛾𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where Medicaid𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a binary variable indicating that individual i residing in state s during year t is 
enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the calendar year, Vision𝑠,𝑡−1 is equal to one if state s covered 
eye exams and glasses for at least six months of year t-1, X𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of demographic characteristics 
including age, race/ethnicity, marital status, sex, education, and citizenship status, 𝜏𝑡 is a set of year 
fixed effects, 𝛾𝑠 is a set of state fixed effects, and  𝑡 × 𝛾𝑠 represents linear state-specific trends. Finally, 
𝑍𝑠,𝑡−1 is a set of state-year variables including the poverty rate, unemployment rate, the number of 
primary care physicians per 10,000 population, the Medicaid managed care penetration rate, the 
Medicaid eligibility threshold for working parents, and an indicator for whether a state had an earnings 
disregard for parental eligibility. These variables incorporate a one year lag from the reference calendar 
year, similar to the Medicaid adult vision coverage indicator, since the main purpose of including them 
is to account for changes to state-level factors that could be coincident with changes to vision coverage 
policies. The subscript t refers to the reference calendar year (rather than the survey year). All estimates 
are weighted to produce nationally representative estimates using survey weights available from the 
Census, and errors are clustered at the state level to account for serial correlation in the policy variable 
                                                 
5 Significant changes to the composition of the Medicaid sample that are concurrent with changes to 
vision benefits would be a potential concern regardless of the source, and our analysis should capture 
such changes. However, it should be noted that while this is perhaps the most appropriate test as it 
relates to the validity of our main analysis, it is more exploratory in assessing the relationship between 
vision benefits and participation in Medicaid.  
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(Bertrand et al. 2004). Given the clusters are moderate in number (51), this approach is unlikely to over-
reject the null (Cameron & Miller 2015).  
After investigating whether state vision coverage policies are correlated with enrollment in 
Medicaid, we proceed with our analysis of the effect of vision benefits on employment outcomes. Our 
main results come from a triple difference (DDD) model that estimates effects for a treatment group of 
adults enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the reference year relative to a low-income control 
group of adults who were not enrolled in Medicaid at any time during the year and who are not expected 
to receive any direct benefit from Medicaid vision coverage. Intuitively, the DDD estimate nets out any 
confounding state-specific time-varying factor that is common for Medicaid enrollees and their control 
group counterparts. Our preferred specification is of the following form: 
(2)  Y𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1Medicaid𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2Vision𝑠,𝑡−1 × Medicaid𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3X𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 +  𝜏𝑡 × Medicaid𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 ×
        Medicaid𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 × 𝛾𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡      
Where Medicaid𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one if individual i is enrolled in Medicaid at any time 
during reference calendar year t and the vector of demographic variables are as defined above. In 
addition to state and year fixed effects, our preferred DDD model also includes a full set of interactions 
between year and Medicaid status, state and Medicaid status, and state and year. These terms provide 
flexible control for differences in trends over time and across states, respectively, for Medicaid enrollees 
and the control group, as well as for time-varying state-level factors that do not vary systematically with 
Medicaid status. The main coefficient of interest, 𝛽2̂, represents the effect of vision coverage (i.e., exams 
and eyeglasses compared to exams only or neither) on employment outcome, Y𝑖𝑠𝑡, for Medicaid 
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enrollees relative to the control group (i.e., the DDD estimate). As before, all estimates are weighted to 
be nationally representative and errors are clustered at the state level.6 
Identification under the DDD framework requires less restrictive assumptions than a typical 
difference-in-differences approach—namely the DDD is not biased by omitted variables that affect both 
the propensity to provide vision benefits and labor market outcomes, as long as those variables affect the 
Medicaid and non-Medicaid populations similarly. For example, the approach will subtract out any 
general effect of a macro-economic shock. 
We also present results for alternative models that omit the full set of state-by-year terms and 
instead include the set of time-varying state-level variables as described above and/or state-specific 
linear time trends. When omitting state-by-year effects, we include both the Medicaid adult vision 
coverage indicator as well as the interaction of vision coverage with Medicaid status. This allows us to 
estimate an effect for the control group based on the coefficient estimate on the vision coverage 
indicator, providing a check on our estimates for Medicaid enrollees.7 Significant control group effects 
are not automatically cause for concern. However, estimated control group effects that are statistically 
and/or economically significant would place substantial onus on the control group to absorb 
                                                 
6 All analyses use the Census provided weights. However, we also estimate models using alternative 
weights that adjust for imputation biases and a non-linearity in the sum of the Census weights that is 
induced by a switch to new Decennial Census population totals (Ziegenfuss & Davern, 2011). We also 
repeat analyses without survey weights. Results are consistent regardless of which (or if any) weights 
are used. See Appendix Table 4.  
7 We also estimate separate models for the control group and our findings are very similar. Results are 
available upon request. 
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confounding factors that are correlated with both Medicaid adult vision coverage policies and labor 
market outcomes, whereas small and non-significant effects would suggest that this is less of a concern.8 
We conduct several checks to examine the robustness of our results. First, perhaps the largest 
threat to our design is if a state makes other changes to its Medicaid program at the same time as it 
changes its vision coverage policy. For example, a state might cut adult vision benefits at the same time 
as it cuts other important optional benefits like dental coverage, which might also effect employment. 
Though we cannot definitively rule out this possibility, we estimate models that control for two 
measures of Medicaid program generosity: Medicaid spending per person and state-by-year indicators of 
dental coverage. In both cases these variables are interacted with Medicaid status so that we can 
preserve the full set of two-way interactions shown in Equation 2.  
Second, we examine how sensitive our results are to the use of alternative control groups, 
including all higher income adults, privately insured low-income adults, and uninsured low-income 
adults. Because the labor-market activity of these various groups is likely influenced by a different set of 
state-year factors, finding consistent results across control groups would increase our confidence in the 
main model. We also estimate a difference-in-differences model with no control group to test the 
sensitivity of our results to the use of any control group.  
Third, we examine economic conditions as a potential source of bias by assigning the vision 
coverage histories of those states that changed their vision coverage policy to a geographic neighbor that 
did not change its policy during our study period, but was likely subject to similar economic shocks. 
This placebo test is similar to one used by Buchmueller, Miller, and Vujicic (2016) in their study of 
                                                 
8 Non-significant control group effects, of course, do not completely rule out the possibility of 
confounding factors as a source of bias. 
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Medicaid adult dental coverage policies. In the event that shocks common to geographic neighbors were 
driving our results, we would expect this test to show significant associations between placebo vision 
coverage policies and employment outcomes of the same sign and similar magnitude to our main 
estimates. As a further check, we examine results using data from only prior to the Great Recession and 
the imposition of the ACA’s maintenance of eligibility rules in 2010 (results are available in Appendix 
Table 5). 
Fourth, our preferred analysis restricts the sample to adults with incomes of less than 200% of 
poverty. We examine if relaxing or removing this restriction alters our findings. In particular, we want to 
ensure that restricting by income does not lead to sample changes coincident with changes to vision 
coverage policies, since it is plausible that adding vision benefits could increase income above the 
threshold for sample inclusion.  
Finally, we estimate an intent-to-treat difference-in-differences model where we use adults with 
less than a high school education, or alternatively, those with family incomes less than 400 percent FPL, 
as our analysis sample (Appendix Table 7). These models control for the demographic characteristics 
included in our main models as well as state and year fixed effects. While we expect these results to be 
smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated than our main results since the vast majority of these 
samples would not be affected by Medicaid adult vision benefit policies, results that are qualitatively 
similar would provide further reassurance that our findings are not driven by compositional changes 
coincident with changes to vision coverage policies.  
2.4. Final Sample 
Our main Medicaid sample included survey respondents ages 22-64 with family income less than 
two times the federal poverty level who reported that they had Medicaid coverage at some time during 
the reference calendar year. Similar to previous analyses of the effects of Medicaid adult vision 
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coverage, we selected this age range since Medicaid enrollees up to age 21 are eligible for vision 
coverage through the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit, and 
therefore are not subject to Medicaid adult vision coverage policies. We excluded people who were age 
65 and over since these individuals were likely eligible for Medicare and retirement benefits, which 
could affect health and employment outcomes. Those under age 65 who reported Medicare coverage and 
those receiving any supplemental security income were also excluded since these individuals were likely 
eligible for Medicaid due to disability.9 According to previous calculations, the majority of non-elderly 
adults (about 81 percent) eligible for Medicaid and not Medicare are not eligible due to a disability 
(Lipton & Decker 2015). We limited our Medicaid sample to individuals with family income below two 
times the federal poverty level because most state income eligibility limits for adults were far below this 
level during our period of study (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014b). Finally, we excluded individuals 
who reported Medicaid and a second form of insurance coverage since these individuals may have had 
an alternative source of vision coverage. 
We imposed similar restrictions on the control group sample to improve comparability. The main 
control group for our DDD analysis consisted of adults ages 22-64 with family incomes below two times 
the federal poverty level who did not report Medicaid or Medicare coverage and did not report receiving 
any supplemental security income during the reference calendar year. Given these exclusions, our main 
analysis sample included 48,020 Medicaid enrollees and 267,734 low-income adults not enrolled in 
Medicaid interviewed during 2002-2013.   
                                                 
9 Adults eligible for Medicaid due to disability are in many instances, though not always, subject to the 
same vision coverage policies as non-disabled adults. However, employment outcomes among these 
individuals likely respond differently to changes in coverage generosity. For these reasons, we exclude 
those who appear to be on Medicaid due to disability from our sample.  
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Table 1 provides the means of the demographic characteristics included as control variables in 
our model for the sample of Medicaid enrollees, low-income individuals not enrolled in Medicaid, and 
the combined sample.10 Among the combined sample, the average age is about 39 years, 49 percent are 
non-Hispanic white, 45 percent are male, and 25 percent have less than a high school diploma. On 
average during 2001-2012, 65 percent resided in a state that provided Medicaid adult vision coverage 
according to our definition. Comparing the Medicaid and control group samples, Medicaid enrollees are 
significantly less likely to be non-Hispanic White, married, male, or to have some college or more 
education and more likely to be non-Hispanic black, have less than a high school degree, and to be a 
U.S. citizen.  
Significant differences in average characteristics for Medicaid enrollees and the control group 
sample are not an issue for our empirical strategy in isolation. However, compositional differences in the 
Medicaid sample relative to the control group sample that are correlated with changes to vision coverage 
policies could bias our estimates if our model is misspecified. We test for compositional differences in 
observable characteristics using the following regression: 
 (3)  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑠 ×
       𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑠 × 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
                                                 
10 In Appendix Table 1, we provided a detailed descriptive table of the outcome means. In this table, we 
compare the outcomes of Medicaid enrollees with and without vision coverage and control group 
individuals in states with and without Medicaid vision coverage. While the descriptive differences 
between these groups cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of vision coverage, they are nonetheless 
qualitatively similar to our main empirical results. 
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Where X𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the set of covariates and all other variables are as defined before. A significant 
coefficient estimate, 𝛽2̂, would indicate a difference in the covariate for Medicaid enrollees relative to 
the control group in states with relative to without vision coverage. Table 2 presents the results of this 
exercise, as well as an analogous investigation for the Medicaid sample only. As shown in the third 
column of Table 2, estimates for most covariates are not significant at conventional levels. The 
exception is race/ethnicity. In particular, it appears that Medicaid enrollees residing in states with 
compared to without vision coverage are more likely to be non-Hispanic white and Asian, and less likely 
to be Hispanic relative to the control group. (Results are similar for the Medicaid sample only, except 
that the coefficient estimate for non-Hispanic white is smaller and not statistically significant.) 
Controlling for race/ethnicity in our regression models may reduce or eliminate potential bias if the 
model is properly specified. Further, combining these estimates with computed outcome means by 
race/ethnicity to assess the potential magnitude of any bias suggests it is unlikely that compositional 
effects could explain our findings. For example, we estimated that vision benefits are associated with a 
3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to part time or not 
working. Our calculations based on the results shown in Table 2 imply that about 0.18 percentage 
points, or 5%, of this increase could be explained by compositional differences. 
2.5. Outcome Trends 
While the main assumption underlying our DDD model is fundamentally untestable, we assess 
whether outcome trends differed between states that eventually changed their vision coverage policies 
relative to those that did not for Medicaid beneficiaries relative the control group. To capture the largest 
number of states that ultimately changed their vision coverage policies before any change, we restricted 
our analysis period to 2001-2007 (CPS years 2002-2008). Eight states changed their coverage policies 
for the first time during or after 2008, including: California, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, 
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North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington.11 States that changed their coverage policies prior to 2008 
were excluded from the sample for this analysis. We estimated the following regression: 
 (4)  Y𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1Changer𝑠 × Medicaid𝑖𝑡 × year𝑡 + 𝛽2X𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 × Medicaid𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 ×  Medicaid𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜏𝑡 × 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡      
Where Changer𝑠 is an indicator equal to one for the eight states that eventually changed their vision 
coverage policies during our study period and zero otherwise, year𝑡 is a linear yearly trend, and all other 
variables are as defined above. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between being a changer state, 
Medicaid status, and the linear yearly trend is of interest. We also estimated analogous models with no 
within-state control group (i.e., Medicaid beneficiaries only).   
Table 3 presents the results of this analysis, both for the Medicaid sample only (Model 1) and 
including the within-state control group (Model 2). We did not detect a significant difference in trends 
for most of the outcomes we studied, with the exception of the log hourly wage for which trends differed 
at the five percent level regardless of whether we included the within-state control group. We also found 
a borderline significant difference in trends in part-time work when we included the within-state control 
group (p=0.06), but not when we analyzed the Medicaid sample only (p=0.21). Taken together, we do 
not find strong evidence that our identifying assumption is violated. Further, we present results with 
various alternative within-state control groups as well as without a control group, and our results are 
                                                 
11 Three of these states changed their policies in 2011, and therefore do not contribute to identification in 
our DDD analysis that uses lagged vision coverage policies. We repeated the same analysis excluding 
these three states (ID, NC, and WA) with very similar results. We chose to include all eight states in the 
analysis that appears in the paper since the larger sample size may increase the chance of detecting 
significant differences in outcome trends. 
23 
 
 
very consistent across these specifications. Our results are also generally robust to the inclusion of 
Medicaid-specific linear state trends. However, our analysis of outcome trends suggests caution when 
interpreting the log hourly wage results, in particular.  
3. Results 
3.1. Vision Benefits and Enrollment in Medicaid 
We find no evidence of an association between Medicaid adult vision coverage and enrollment in 
Medicaid among low-income adults. Coefficient estimates for the vision coverage indicator shown in 
Table 4 are relatively small in magnitude and not statistically significant regardless of the model 
specification considered. The estimated association ranges from 0.04 to 0.32 percentage points, 
depending on model controls. The 95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates suggest that we 
can rule out large effects. For example, the 95 percent confidence interval for the Model 4 estimate 
ranges from -0.7 percentage points to 1.4 percentage points. Coefficient estimates for the other 
explanatory variables are of the expected signs (not shown). Racial and ethnic minorities, females, those 
with less education, and U.S. citizens are all significantly more likely to report Medicaid coverage. 
These findings improve our confidence that the results that follow are not a function of compositional 
changes in our sample. 
3.2. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Results 
Table 5 presents the results of our preferred, fully saturated DDD model (Model 5), as well as 
several alternative models that do not include the full set of state-by-year interaction terms (Models 1-
4).12 The controls included in each column of Table 5 become progressively more flexible moving from 
left to right. In particular, Model 1 does not include any explicit controls for time-varying state-level 
                                                 
12 Coefficient estimates for key explanatory variables are available in Appendix Table 2. 
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factors, Model 2 incorporates specific time-varying state-level variables, Model 3 includes linear state-
specific trends, Model 4 includes both state-specific variables and trends, and finally Model 5 includes 
fully flexible state-by-year interactions. Our results are largely consistent across models and suggest that 
Medicaid adult vision coverage is associated with a significant increase in the likelihood of working 
full-time compared to part-time or not working, and among the employed, increases in usual hours 
worked, full-time vs. part-time work, and the mean log occupation wage.  
Focusing on the results of Model 5, we find that vision coverage is associated with an increase in 
the likelihood of working full time compared to part time or not working of 3.6 percentage points, 
representing an increase of about 13 percent relative to the mean in states without vision coverage (28.3 
percent). We also find a borderline significant 2.2 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of 
working part-time (11 percent reduction relative to the mean). While the magnitude of this latter 
estimate is fairly consistent across models, it is not statistically significant in some specifications (i.e., 
Models 2-4). Regardless of the model, vision coverage does not appear to be significantly associated 
with a change in the likelihood of being employed for at least one week. Our preferred estimate suggests 
a 1.4 percentage point increase, but this estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels.13  
                                                 
13 Our measure of employment indicates whether a respondent reported working at all during the 
reference calendar year, a very inclusive measure. We also considered alternative measures based on the 
number of weeks worked (e.g., worked at least 26 weeks compared to fewer). Estimates using these 
alternative measures were generally similar in magnitude to those shown in the paper, though were 
sometimes borderline significant. For example, we estimated that vision coverage was associated with a 
1.9 percentage point increase in having worked 26 or more weeks compared to fewer, and this estimate 
was significant at the 10 percent level. Nonetheless, these analyses did not produce strong evidence of a 
significant positive effect on extensive margin employment measures. 
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 To further investigate potential intensive margin effects, we examined hours worked and other 
outcomes among the subsample of Medicaid enrollees who were employed for at least one week during 
the year. Because we do not find large changes in the likelihood of being employed as a result of 
changes to vision coverage policies, sub-setting to the employed is unlikely to introduce substantial bias. 
Again focusing on model 5, we estimate that vision coverage is associated with an increase in usual 
hours worked of 5.9 log points, or 6.1 percent (i.e., about 2.0 additional hours during a typical week). 
We also find an increase of 5.6 percentage points in the likelihood of working full time compared to part 
time, representing an increase of about 10 percent relative to the mean in states without vision coverage 
(58.9 percent). In addition to changes in hours worked, we also find evidence that vision coverage may 
facilitate switching to higher skilled occupations. Similar to Autor (2013), we use the mean log 
occupation wage for non-farming occupations to measure the degree of skill required for a given 
occupation. Our findings imply that vision coverage is associated with a significant increase in this 
measure.14 The results of Models 1-4 are remarkably similar to those from Model 5, as shown in Table 
5.  
We do not, however, find evidence of a significant association between vision coverage and the 
implied hourly wage. In fact, the point estimates for this outcome are negative. Because we estimated 
significant differences in trends for the log hourly wage in states that changed their vision coverage 
policies relative to those that did not, we are less confident in the estimates for this outcome. However, 
there are a few potential explanations for the apparent disconnect between the mean log occupation 
wage and log hourly wage results. First, if an individual remains in the same job, then wages would 
likely adjust more slowly to improvements in productive capability than hours worked. Further, there 
                                                 
14 Results (not shown) were generally similar when we included Medicaid-specific state linear time 
trends, both in terms of magnitude and significance. 
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may be restrictions on how much compensation an employer can provide for a given position. Second, if 
an individual switches to a new occupation with higher earning potential, he may not realize these wage 
gains until he accrues some experience in the new position. Finally, occupation may be reported more 
accurately than earnings, which we used to compute the hourly wage. 
Our intent-to-treat difference-in-differences estimates using a sample of adults with less than a 
high school education and alternatively, with family income less than 400 percent FPL provide 
additional support for our main findings (see Appendix Table 7). These results are expectedly weaker 
and smaller in magnitude compared to our main results, but we find evidence of a significant increase in 
intensive margin measures. For example, when considering adults with less than a high school 
education, we estimate an increase of 0.8 log points in usual hours worked (p<0.05) and a 0.9 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to part time (p<0.10). Since about 13.5% 
of this sample was enrolled in Medicaid during the reference calendar year, the magnitude of these 
estimates are roughly in line with what we would expect. In particular, scaling these intent-to-treat 
estimates by the proportion of treated individuals would suggest an increase of 5.8 log points in usual 
hours worked and a 6.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to part 
time. By comparison, our main results suggested increases of 5.9 and 5.6 in these measures.  
Because Models 1-4 do not include state-by-year terms, they include the Medicaid adult vision 
coverage indicator as well as its interaction with Medicaid status. The coefficient estimate for the vision 
coverage indicator provides an estimate of the association between vision coverage policies and 
outcomes for the control group. Table 6 provides additional estimates from Model 1 for the control 
group and Medicaid enrollees in addition to the DDD estimates shown in Model 5 of Table 5. Estimates 
for the control group, shown in the second column of Table 6, are generally small in magnitude and 
none are statistically significant. While the primary purpose of the control group is to absorb time-
varying state-level confounders that are associated with vision coverage policies and also affect 
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employment outcomes, a significant association could be concerning to the extent that these confounders 
are not fully captured by the use of a control group or by the model controls. While the absence of a 
significant association does not completely eliminate this concern, it is reassuring.15  
3.3. Subgroup Analysis 
We use our preferred, fully saturated DDD model to investigate whether Medicaid adult vision 
coverage policies have different effects by sex, marital status, and age. Results may differ across these 
strata if vision benefits have differential effects on the use of vision services or improvements to vision 
by subgroup, or if certain subgroups are more likely to work in occupations where resolving vision-
related difficulties has a larger effect on employment-related outcomes. Further, access to vision 
coverage could interact with underlying differences by subgroup that are not captured by model 
controls, such as discriminatory practices or differences in alternatives to work. The results by sex are 
shown in Table 7. Results by marital status and age are available in Appendix Table 6.  
Our results indicate that the effects of vision coverage on employment outcomes may be more 
pronounced among females than males. Vision coverage is associated with a significant 5.4 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of working full time compared to part time or not working among 
females compared to a point estimate of 1.3 percentage points that is not statistically significant among 
males, with the difference being significant at the ten percent level. Vision coverage is not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of being employed for males or females, though the point estimate for 
females is larger in magnitude (i.e., 2.2 percentage points compared to 0.9 percentage points). Among 
the employed, we find that vision coverage is associated with a significant 8.6 log points, or 9.0%, 
increase in usual hours worked for females compared to a point estimate of 2.9 log points, or 3.0%, that 
is not statistically significant among males, though this difference is not statistically significant 
                                                 
15 Results are very similar when a difference-in-differences analysis is run for the control group alone. 
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(p=0.11). Vision coverage is, however, associated with a significantly greater increase in the likelihood 
of working full time compared to part time among females compared to males (i.e., 9.1 percentage 
points vs. 0.7 percentage points, with the difference being significant at the ten percent level).  
Results for married compared to unmarried individuals are similar in many instances (see 
Appendix Table 6), though there appears to be more evidence that effects are mostly on the intensive 
margin for married individuals whereas this attribution is less clear among unmarried individuals. 
Further, the association between vision coverage and the mean log occupation wage is larger in 
magnitude for married individuals than the corresponding estimate for unmarried individuals (which is 
also not statistically significant), though the difference between these estimates is not significant at 
conventional levels. When considering results for individuals under age 35 compared to at least age 35, 
results are very similar in magnitude in most instances, and none of the differences for these age groups 
are statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6). 
3.4. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several tests of the robustness of our main results. First, we explore whether our 
results are sensitive to inclusion of other measures of Medicaid program generosity. Table 8 presents 
results from our preferred DDD model that also includes Medicaid expenditures per person as a measure 
of general program generosity (Model 1), and alternatively, Medicaid adult dental benefits as a measure 
plausibly related to adult vision benefits (Model 2). These measures are each interacted with Medicaid 
status, and the results shown are the DDD estimates for Medicaid adult vision coverage after including 
these controls. Overall, our estimates are very similar to our main results. While the coefficient estimate 
for having worked at least one week in the last year increases in magnitude in both Models 1 and 2, it is 
only borderline significant in Model 1 and remains insignificant in Model 2. 
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Second, we examine the robustness of our results to the use of alternative control groups to 
ascertain how stable our results are across different counterfactuals (Table 9). Our main control group 
(i.e. Tables 5 and 6) consisted of all low-income adults who did not report enrollment in Medicaid at any 
time during the past year, regardless of what other coverage they may have had. In Table 9, we report 
results from models that use control groups composed of (1) low-income adults who were privately 
insured at some point during the past year; (2) low-income adults who were uninsured all year; and (3) 
higher income adults with family incomes between 300 and 400 percent FPL. In addition to providing 
an indication of the stability of our results across different control group populations, survey participants 
may be more likely to confuse different sources of insurance coverage than to misreport their insured 
status. Therefore, those that said they were uninsured for the full year may be less likely to have had 
Medicaid coverage at some point (and therefore less likely to be inaccurately assigned to the control 
group). Reassuringly, our results are similar regardless of the control group used. 
Table 9 also shows the results of a difference-in-differences analysis with no within state control 
group (first column). Again, results are very similar to our preferred DDD model. 
Third, we explore the potential for bias due to policy endogeneity. In addition to controlling for 
the annual state unemployment rate (Table 5), and showing that our results are robust to inclusion of 
other measures of Medicaid program generosity (Table 8), we employ a placebo test that assigns vision 
coverage policy changes to neighboring states that did not actually experience a change (similar to one 
used by Buchmueller et al. (2016)). The idea is that geographic neighbors were likely subject to similar 
economic shocks, so that if economic conditions were driving our results rather than changes to vision 
coverage policies, we would estimate significant placebo effects of a similar magnitude to our main 
results. Our sample for this analysis included all states that did not change coverage policies during our 
study period and excluded those states that did experience a policy change. We were able to match eight 
of the ten states that changed coverage policies during our study period (and contributed to identification 
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in our main model) to a geographic neighbor. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 10, with 
and without controlling for state-year variables, linear state-specific time trends, and the full set of state-
by-year interactions. Of 35 estimates (seven outcomes across five different models), only one estimate is 
significant at the ten percent level and it is wrong-signed. The estimated association between vision 
coverage and being employed last year is similar in magnitude to our main results, though this 
association is not significant in our placebo or main analysis. We estimate a placebo association between 
vision coverage and working full time compared to part time or not working that is about half the size of 
our main estimate, and a placebo estimate for part time status that is wrong-signed and less than one-
quarter the size of our main estimate. When considering the employed sample, our placebo estimate of 
the association between vision coverage and usual hours worked is less than ten percent of the size of 
our main estimate, and the placebo estimate for the mean log occupation wage is wrong-signed. Overall, 
these results provide additional evidence that economic conditions are unlikely to be driving the 
relationship we observe between vision coverage policies and intensive margin employment measures 
such as hours worked and occupational skill requirements. 
We also test whether the effects of changes to vision benefits could be conflated with the Great 
Recession or the maintenance of eligibility rules implemented in 2010 as part of the ACA by restricting 
our analysis period to calendar years 2001-2007. While this restriction eliminates some of our 
identifying variation, our main findings are of the expected sign and maintain statistical significance in 
almost all instances (these results are shown in Appendix Table 5). Since this analysis covers a different 
timeframe and only a subset of the states that changed their coverage policies are used to identify the 
effects of vision benefits, some differences from our main results are not unexpected. However, one 
surprising and interesting departure is that the estimate for the effect of vision benefits on the hourly 
wage becomes positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. Overall, the fact that the 
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results are, in general, qualitatively similar to results using the full analysis period suggests that neither 
the Great Recession nor maintenance of eligibility rules is driving our findings.  
Finally, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the income restriction we place on our 
sample, since increases in earnings associated with vision coverage could be obscured by this exclusion. 
Most individuals meeting all requirements for our Medicaid sample except for the income restriction 
have incomes below this level (about 80 percent), and would need to in order to be eligible for Medicaid 
at some point during the year. Nonetheless, we explore this potential source of bias by comparing results 
that restrict the sample to those with family incomes up to 200 percent FPL to results that use a sample 
restriction of income up to 400 percent FPL, and also to results that do not impose any income 
restriction on the sample (Table 11). In general, results that were significant in our preferred 
specification maintain significance when the income restriction is relaxed, but the estimated intensive 
margin effects are smaller in magnitude in some instances when considering the higher income samples. 
The indicator for working part time is no longer statistically significant once the sample income 
restriction is relaxed, though the estimated effect of vision coverage on this outcome is only significant 
at the 10 percent level in our main specification. 
4. Conclusions 
The provision of Medicaid adult vision benefits substantially increases eye doctor visits, 
decreases self-reported visual impairment, and improves the likelihood of having appropriately corrected 
distance vision by up to 10 percentage points (Lipton & Decker 2015; Lipton & Decker 2016). Given 
evidence that poor vision can have adverse impacts on a range of activities of daily living, it is plausible 
that improvements to vision could have positive effects on work productivity. Our findings suggest that 
Medicaid coverage of adult vision services does indeed increase hours worked, the likelihood of 
working full time compared to part time, and that it facilitates transitions to occupations with higher 
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earning potential. These intensive margin effects could have been facilitated by increasing worker 
qualifications for different types of jobs, decreasing transportation constraints that allow working more 
hours at the same job, working more jobs, working different shifts (i.e. evening and night shifts) that 
require night driving, or relieving discomfort that limits the amount or type of work a beneficiary 
pursues.  
Because corrective lenses are durable goods that only need to be replaced in the event of loss, 
damage, or further vision deterioration, the effects we observed might persist after a worker leaves 
Medicaid or if a state withdraws vision benefits. This also suggests we may underestimate the effects of 
dropping vision coverage as they may not materialize in the near term.    
Our estimates of the effect of vision coverage on extensive margin employment were positive, 
but small and non-significant. While we excluded individuals most likely to be eligible for Medicaid due 
to a disability, there is evidence that a substantial share of adult enrollees who are not receiving 
supplemental security income have a work-limiting health problem. According to research from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2017a), more than one-third of non-disabled adult enrollees who are not 
working cite illness or disability as the reason. An additional 28% report that they cannot work because 
they are taking care of home or family, and 26% report that they are going to school or retired. Only 
11% of non-disabled adult enrollees who are not working report the reason as not being able to find 
work, or other. This analysis indicates that the majority of Medicaid enrollees who are not working have 
low labor force attachment and may not be able to, or desire to, enter into employment regardless of the 
incentive or a marginal change in functional ability. The lack of a significant effect on extensive margin 
employment may also be less surprising given that our employment variable was full-year—non-
workers did not work at all. Further, it is possible that people with at least some work experience are 
more likely to be aware of vision coverage when it exists and more able to navigate the health system to 
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utilize those benefits. Regardless, our estimates suggest that vision benefits improve the labor activity of 
those who are already supplying some labor in a given year.  
 Eye exams and corrective lenses represent substantial financial burdens to a typical low-income 
adult without vision coverage. However, the costs faced by Medicaid can be relatively small. For 
example, the 2017 fee schedule in New York stipulated a $78 fee for evaluation and management of a 
new non-facility optometry patient (code 92004), $6 for frames (code V2020), and $6-$17 for lenses 
(codes V2100 – V2114), depending on correction strength (New York State Department of Health, 
2017). Our results suggest that there might be a significant return to a state’s relatively minor investment 
in vision coverage.  
Though we did not find evidence of an increase in the hourly wage, our main estimates implied 
that vision coverage increased typical weekly hours worked by 6.1 percent, or about 2.0 hours per week. 
Since, on average, Medicaid enrollees earned about $12.50 per hour in 2017 dollars, this increase 
translates to an additional $24.50 per week worked. Given that employed Medicaid enrollees reported 
working about 37 weeks of the year on average, a back-of-the envelope calculation implies a $907 
increase in annual earnings. This estimate may represent a lower bound for a beneficiary with a 
correctable vision deficiency, assuming that they are the only people that benefit from vision services. 
Given that 37% of Medicaid beneficiaries in states without vision coverage have any under-correction of 
distance vision (i.e., presenting visual acuity of 20/30 or worse that can be corrected to 20/25 or better) 
(Lipton & Decker 2016), extending vision benefits in states that currently do not cover them could 
increase annual earnings for those most likely to gain from access to vision correction by as much as 
$2,451 ($907/0.37).  
Comparing Medicaid’s cost, based on the New York fee schedule, and the potential for 
additional earnings based on our estimates suggests that an enrollee would have to work for about four 
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weeks of the year to compensate for the states’ costs of providing an eye exam and glasses. Put another 
way, an investment in vision coverage could result in an $809 per person surplus ($24.50*33 weeks) by 
the end of the year among employed beneficiaries. Even only accounting for the monetary benefits of 
vision coverage to the employed and assuming every beneficiary who was not employed incurred the 
cost of an exam and glasses (at the New York fee schedule), our calculation implies that the benefits of 
vision coverage easily outweigh the costs given that about half of the adults in our sample were 
employed. New York generally pays lower rates to providers than other states and it is likely that other 
states face higher costs to provide exams and glasses. However, providing vision coverage would only 
have an unfavorable cost to benefit comparison if the cost of an exam and glasses were nearly five times 
as much as the New York cost.  
While this back-of-the-envelope calculation (subject to the usual caveats) could under- or 
overstate the true returns to gaining vision coverage, it does suggest a large return relative to the cost 
from the individual perspective. We estimated that uninsured people pay an average of $382 in out-of-
pocket costs for a vision exam and glasses, which is substantially smaller than the estimated $907 
increase in annual earnings. This raises the question of why low-income people without vision benefits 
do not finance vision exams and eyeglasses themselves. There are several possible reasons. First, the 
cost of vision correction must be paid up front, while the benefits accrue slowly over time. Second, and 
relatedly, we estimated the average out-of-pocket cost to obtain vision correction without insurance to 
be about 37% of a low-income person’s monthly income. Individuals living below the poverty level may 
be unable or unwilling to finance that cost at the expense of other necessities. Third, financing the costs 
of vision correction in the near term because of expected increased future earnings assumes accurate 
foresight and rationality. Our findings suggest that vision benefits are associated with about two 
additional hours worked per week. Some individuals may not anticipate this relatively minor change to 
their work schedules as a result of improved vision. Further, a large literature in behavioral economics 
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demonstrates significant departures from rationality in a variety of settings. For example, present bias 
suggests that people may delay immediate costs even if they are associated with substantial long-run 
gain (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Finally, people may underestimate the severity of their vision 
problems, and therefore also underestimate the benefit to gaining vision correction.  
 Our results are subject to a number of caveats. For example, Medicaid status is known to be 
reported with error in the CPS. Given that this error usually results in misclassification of coverage type 
rather than coverage status we were encouraged by the fact our results remained consistent when 
restricting the control group to uninsured individuals. It is also possible that some unaccounted for factor 
correlated with a state’s vision coverage decision was also correlated with the outcomes of interest. 
However, our triple-difference design substantially limits the number of potential factors to those that 
affected the Medicaid population, but not any of the alternative control groups we considered. 
Furthermore, our results remained consistent when controlling for state-specific trends or explicitly 
controlling for changes in macro-economic conditions, other Medicaid policy features, and general 
health care supply.  
In this paper, we provide some of the first evidence to suggest that a relatively low cost 
intervention financed by Medicaid can have important positive effects on the short-run economic 
activity of adults. Our results have the potential to inform the trade-off that state and federal policy 
makers must make between the benefits of Medicaid generosity and program cost, as well as ongoing 
policy debates over establishing work requirements in Medicaid (Price & Verma 2017). In particular, 
our findings suggest that, in some cases, Medicaid enrollees are not restricting their labor only because 
of work disincentives predicted by standard economic theory, but because they lack resources that could 
enable fuller participation in the labor market. This suggests that a worthwhile avenue for those 
interested in encouraging labor force participation among Medicaid enrollees is the provision of services 
that alleviate work-limiting impairments. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Timeline of changes to Medicaid adult vision coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Medicaid adult vision coverage policies (various sources).  
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Figure 2: Percentage of Medicaid enrollees with vision coverage for at least six months of the calendar 
year, with US recession bars, CPS 2002-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Current Population Survey, 2002-2013. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Weighted sample characteristics, CPS 2002-2013 
 
  Mean/Percent (SE) 
  All   Medicaid   
Control 
group 
       
Age  38.92  37.48  39.17*** 
  (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.17) 
White, non-Hispanic  48.90  44.00  49.73** 
  (4.41)  (4.77)  (4.44) 
Black, non-Hispanic  16.96  21.81  16.14*** 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   (2.13)  (2.74)  (2.07) 
Hispanic  27.02  26.31  27.14 
  (5.45)  (6.31)  (5.42) 
Asian/other  7.12  7.87  6.99 
  (0.90)  (0.94)  (0.90) 
Married  48.16  46.53  48.43 
  (1.27)  (2.35)  (1.21) 
Male  45.01  32.35  47.14*** 
  (0.40)  (0.81)  (0.46) 
Less than high school degree  25.38  32.01  24.26*** 
  (2.01)  (2.55)  (2.12) 
High school degree  36.49  37.64  36.30** 
  (1.58)  (1.84)  (1.55) 
Some college or more education  38.13  30.35  39.44*** 
  (0.93)  (0.99)  (1.03) 
US citizen  79.76  82.65  79.28* 
  (3.38)  (4.50)  (3.24) 
Medicaid enrollee  14.39  100.00  0.00 
  (1.37)     
Resides in state with Medicaid 
adult vision coverage  65.48  67.10  65.21 
    (6.37)   (6.78)   (6.43) 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample includes 48,020 adults 
who were on Medicaid at some point during the past calendar year and 267,734 low-income adults who were not on 
Medicaid in the past year. All estimates are expressed as percentages, except for age which is expressed in years. Sampling 
weights are used to produce nationally-representative estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. 
T-tests were used to test the difference in mean characteristics between Medicaid beneficiaries and the control group. 
Significance stars indicate a significant difference compared with Medicaid beneficiaries. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 2:  Covariate balance test, CPS 2002-2013 
 
Explanatory variables   Coefficient (SE)                                            
    Model 1   Model 2 
     
Age  0.05  0.18 
  (0.41)  (0.49) 
White, non-Hispanic  0.82  2.72** 
  (1.18)  (1.34) 
Black, non-Hispanic  -1.13  -1.18 
  (1.02)  (1.08) 
Hispanic  -2.12**  -3.49** 
  (0.85)  (1.42) 
Asian/other  2.43***  1.95** 
  (0.74)  (0.96) 
Married  1.92  0.96 
  (1.98)  (1.68) 
Male  0.77  1.41 
  (0.68)  (1.28) 
Less than high school 
degree  1.17  -0.39 
  (0.95)  (1.03) 
High school degree  -0.92  -0.70 
  (1.25)  (0.82) 
Some college or more 
education  -0.25  1.09 
  (1.42)  (1.39) 
US citizen  -3.19*  -0.77 
  (1.86)  (0.70) 
          
Control group?   No   Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample includes 48,020 adults 
who were on Medicaid at some point during the past year and 267,734 low-income adults not on Medicaid in the past year. 
Model 1 is a linear probability model in which each explanatory variable is regressed on vision coverage status and state and 
year fixed effects for the sample of Medicaid enrollees only (each coefficient comes from a separate model). Model 2 
includes the low-income control group and is as described in the text. Survey weights were used to produce nationally 
representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. All coefficients were multiplied by 100, except for age. 
The coefficients for age are in terms of years, and the coefficients for all other variables are in terms of percentage points. 
Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 3:  Outcome trends in treatment and control states before changes to vision coverage 
policy, CPS 2002-2008a 
  
P-value for Coefficient on 
Interaction Term 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Full sample   
Worked at least one week last year 0.16 0.18 
   
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 0.59 0.99 
   
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) 0.21 0.06 
   
Employed last year   
Usual hours worked last year (log)    0.96 0.59 
   
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 0.71 0.35 
   
Hourly wage last year (log) 0.03 0.01 
   
Mean log occupation wage 0.56 0.47 
      
Control group?  No Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2008 Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample 
includes eight states that changed their vision coverage policies for the first time during or after 2008, 
including: CA, ID, MI, NV, NM, NC, OR, and WA, as well as all states with consistent coverage during our 
full study period. The results under Model 1 report the p-values for the interaction between changer state 
status and a linear yearly trend for a sample of Medicaid enrollees only. The results under Model 2 report the 
p-values for the three-way interaction between changer state status, Medicaid status, and a linear yearly trend 
for a sample of Medicaid enrollees and the low-income adult control group. Further details are provided in 
the text.  
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Table 4. Regression estimates of the association between vision coverage and participation 
in Medicaid, CPS 2002-2013 
  
Coefficients (SE)                                                           
Percentage Point Change (Scaled by 100) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Vision benefits 0.04 0.29 0.07 0.32 
  (0.69) (0.62) (0.81) (0.53) 
State and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-specific trends No Yes No Yes 
State-year variables No No Yes Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample 
includes 315,754 low-income adults (from the main analysis sample). All regression results were estimated 
using linear probability models that controlled for state and year fixed effects in addition to demographic 
variables. Survey weights were used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered 
at the state level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5. Triple Difference Estimates of the Effect of Medicaid Adult Vision Benefits on 
Employment Outcomes, CPS 2002-2013 
 
  
  
Coefficients (SE) 
Scaled by 100 
Model 1 Model 2
ǂǂ Model 3 Model 4
ǂǂ Model 5 
Full sample         
Worked at least one week last year 1.77 2.02 1.71 1.98 1.44 
 (1.78) (1.55) (1.74) (1.51) (1.76) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 4.02*** 3.87*** 3.56*** 3.70*** 3.60*** 
 (0.83) (0.77) (0.76) (0.74) (0.80) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -2.25* -1.85 -1.85 -1.72 -2.16* 
 (1.28) (1.27) (1.28) (1.30) (1.29) 
Employed last year         
Usual hours worked last year (log)    6.21*** 5.49*** 5.68*** 5.20*** 5.90*** 
 (1.41) (1.53) (1.39) (1.47) (1.37) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 6.03*** 5.50*** 5.32*** 5.21*** 5.63*** 
 (0.99) (1.11) (1.03) (1.20) (1.07) 
Hourly wage last year (log) -1.48 -1.13 -1.52 -1.19 -1.06 
 (1.73) (1.78) (1.79) (1.86) (1.95) 
Mean log occupation wageǂ 2.55*** 2.84*** 2.35*** 2.68*** 2.27*** 
  (0.65) (0.62) (0.57) (0.56) (0.59) 
State-year variables No Yes No Yes No 
State-specific linear trends No No Yes Yes No 
Full state-year interactions No No No No Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample includes 48,020 adults 
who were on Medicaid at some point during the past year and 267,734 low-income adults not on Medicaid in the past year. 
All regression results were estimated using linear probability models that controlled for demographic characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects, and interactions between Medicaid status and state and Medicaid status and year. Survey weights were 
used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. The reported coefficient 
estimates are for the interaction between the vision coverage indicator and Medicaid status. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms log 
points. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
ǂ
Mean log occupation wage is the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category 
(from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 
observations.  
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ǂǂ
Models 2 and 4 include the percentage of the population in poverty, the unemployment rate, the number of primary care 
physicians per 10,000 population, the Medicaid managed care penetration rate, the Medicaid eligibility threshold for working 
parents, and an indicator for whether a state had an earnings disregard for parental eligibility. Information on the earnings 
disregard was missing for CPS years 2002 and 2004, and these years were therefore excluded from Models 2 and 4.  
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Table 6. The effect of Medicaid adult vision benefits on employment outcomes, by 
Medicaid status, CPS 2002-2013 
 
  
  
Coefficients (SE) 
Scaled by 100 
                  
Medicaid Control group  DDD  
Full sample      
Worked at least one week last year 1.53 -0.23 1.77 
 (1.91) (0.46) (1.78) 
Usually worked full time last year                                 
(vs. part time or no work) 3.95*** -0.06 4.02*** 
 (0.75) (0.57) (0.83) 
Usually worked part time last year                  
(vs. full time or no work) -2.42* -0.17 -2.25* 
 (1.30) (0.21) (1.28) 
Employed last year      
Usual hours worked last year (log)    6.34*** 0.13 6.21*** 
 (1.60) (0.37) (1.41) 
Usually worked full time last year                                           
(vs. part time) 6.36*** 0.33 6.03*** 
 (0.91) (0.39) (0.99) 
Hourly wage last year (log) -1.86 -0.38 -1.48 
 (1.94) (0.58) (1.73) 
Mean log occupation wage 2.24*** -0.31 2.55*** 
  (0.62) (0.28) (0.65) 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The sample includes 48,020 adults 
who were on Medicaid at some point during the past year and 267,734 low-income adults not on Medicaid in the past year. 
All regression results were estimated using linear probability models that control for demographic characteristics, state and 
year fixed effects, and interactions between Medicaid status and state and Medicaid status and year. Survey weights were 
used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. The estimates in the first 
column report the sum of the coefficient estimates for the vision coverage indicator and the interaction between vision 
coverage and Medicaid status, those in the second column report the coefficient on the vision coverage indicator, and those in 
the third column report the coefficient on the interaction term between the vision coverage indicator and Medicaid status. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged 
variables are in terms of log points. Mean log occupation wage represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly 
adult CPS sample by occupation category (from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations 
and any categories with fewer than 100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 7. Triple difference estimates of the effect of Medicaid adult vision 
benefits on employment outcomes, by gender, CPS 2002-2013 
 
  
  
Coefficients (SE)  
Scaled by 100 
Male Female 
Full sample     
Worked at least one week last year 0.92 2.17 
 (2.26) (1.55) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 1.27 5.35*** c 
 (1.84) (0.87) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -0.35 -3.19** 
 (2.32) (1.22) 
Employed last year     
Usual hours worked last year (log)    2.91 8.59*** 
 (2.91) (1.61) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 0.73 9.11*** c 
 (3.02) (1.83) 
Hourly wage last year (log) 1.27 -2.19 
 (2.84) (2.54) 
Mean log occupation wage 1.51 3.01*** 
 (1.15) (0.90) 
      
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The results shown above are from 
our preferred DDD model including the full set of state by year interactions, except that the sample is stratified by gender. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for 
logged variables are in terms of log points. Mean log occupation wage represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-
elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category (from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990), excluding farming/fishing 
occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table 8. Robustness to controls for other sources of Medicaid benefit 
generosity, 2002-2013 CPS 
 
  
Coefficient (SE) 
Scaled by 100 
Model 1 Model 2 
Full sample     
Worked at least one week last year 2.56* 2.70 
 (1.49) (2.35) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 4.10*** 4.26*** 
 (0.69) (1.16) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -1.55 -1.55 
 (1.35) (1.62) 
Employed last year     
Usual hours worked last year (log)    5.17*** 4.34** 
 (1.57) (1.82) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 5.30*** 5.30*** 
 (1.30) (1.46) 
Hourly wage last year (log) -0.87 0.51 
 (2.20) (2.57) 
Mean log occupation wage 2.46*** 2.05*** 
  (0.58) (0.62) 
Medicaid expenditures per person Yes No 
Medicaid adult dental coverage No Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Model 1 includes a control for per 
person Medicaid expenditures in addition to all other controls included in our preferred DDD specification. These data are 
only available for CPS years 2005-2013. Model 2 removes these controls (so we can use the full set of sample years), and 
adds state by year indicators of Medicaid adult dental benefit coverage. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates for 
binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. Mean log 
occupation wage represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category (from 
the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 
observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 9. Triple difference estimates of the effect of Medicaid adult vision benefits on employment outcomes, by control group 
definition, 2002-2013 CPS 
 
  
Coefficients (SE)  
Scaled by 100 
No control 
group 
All low income 
adults 
Higher income 
adults 
Privately insured 
low income adults 
Uninsured low 
income adults 
Full sample           
Worked at least one week last year 1.19 1.44 1.13 0.08 2.17 
 (2.09) (1.76) (1.93) (1.80) (2.03) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 3.61*** 3.60*** 3.22*** 3.07*** 4.04*** 
 (0.88) (0.80) (0.91) (0.82) (0.90) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -2.43* -2.16* -2.09* -2.99** -1.87 
 (1.32) (1.29) (1.13) (1.44) (1.37) 
Employed last year           
Usual hours worked last year (log)    6.21*** 5.90*** 5.43*** 6.57*** 5.48*** 
 (1.53) (1.37) (1.39) (1.15) (1.72) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 6.22*** 5.63*** 5.83*** 6.14*** 5.75*** 
 (0.83) (1.07) (0.74) (1.31) (1.04) 
Hourly wage last year (log) -1.94 -1.06 -2.44 -1.89 0.07 
 (1.85) (1.95) (2.38) (1.87) (2.26) 
Mean log occupation wage 2.24*** 2.27*** 2.25** 2.23** 2.32*** 
  (0.65) (0.59) (0.86) (0.85) (0.69) 
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Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The first column (“No control group”) is a difference-in-differences 
specification based only on the Medicaid sample. All remaining columns have the same form as our preferred DDD model including the full set of state by year 
terms. Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. Mean log occupation wage 
represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category (from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding 
farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 10. Geographic neighbor placebo test, CPS 2002-2013 
  
Coefficients (SE) 
Scaled by 100 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Full sample           
Worked at least one week last year 1.15 1.53 1.02 1.69 1.83 
 (1.73) (1.59) (1.70) (1.59) (2.04) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 1.66 1.97 1.36 1.77 2.08 
 (1.30) (1.22) (1.28) (1.24) (1.62) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -0.51 -0.43 -0.35 -0.08 -0.25 
 (1.10) (1.16) (1.10) (1.08) (1.19) 
Employed last year           
Usual hours worked last year (log)    0.46 0.64 0.42 0.28 0.38 
 (2.18) (2.75) (2.25) (2.72) (2.29) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 1.86 2.16 1.55 1.57 1.85 
 (1.57) (1.77) (1.61) (1.71) (1.75) 
Hourly wage last year (log) 2.27 2.09 2.31 2.20 2.08 
 (2.76) (2.67) (2.79) (2.63) (2.87) 
Mean log occupation wage -0.90 -0.70 -1.12 -0.96 -1.88* 
  (0.85) (0.82) (0.96) (0.92) (1.01) 
State-year variablesǂ No Yes No Yes No 
State-specific linear trends No  No Yes Yes No 
Full state-year interactions No No No No Yes 
 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Estimates are from DDD models 
with controls as indicated in the table, and are for the interaction between a placebo vision coverage indicator and Medicaid 
status. The placebo vision coverage indicator was assigned to a treatment state’s neighbor which did not actually change 
their policies during our study period. States that had a true change in policy were excluded from the sample. In particular, 
CA was matched with AZ, MA was matched with CT, MI was matched with WI, FL was matched with GA, MO was 
matched with IA, NM was matched with CO, UT was matched with WY, and TX was matched with OK. There were no 
suitable matches for Nevada or Oregon. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   
 
Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. 
Mean log occupation wage represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation 
category (from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer 
than 100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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ǂ
State-year variables include the percentage of the population in poverty, the unemployment rate, the number of primary care 
physicians per 10,000 population, the Medicaid managed care penetration rate, the Medicaid eligibility threshold for 
working parents, and an indicator for whether a state had an earnings disregard for parental eligibility. Information on the 
earnings disregard was missing for CPS years 2002 and 2004, and these years were therefore excluded from Models 2 and 4. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 11. Triple difference estimates of the effect of Medicaid adult vision benefits on 
employment outcomes, by sample income restrictions, 2002-2013 CPS 
  
Coefficient (SE) 
Scaled by 100 
≤ 200% FPL ≤ 400% FPL None 
Full sample       
Worked at least one week last year 1.44 1.49 0.64 
 (1.76) (1.57) (1.62) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 3.60*** 2.75*** 1.47* 
 (0.80) (0.84) (0.83) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -2.16* -1.26 -0.83 
 (1.29) (1.15) (1.30) 
Employed last year       
Usual hours worked last year (log)    5.90*** 4.49*** 3.88** 
 (1.37) (1.52) (1.80) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 5.63*** 4.28*** 3.10** 
 (1.07) (1.11) (1.49) 
Hourly wage last year (log) -1.06 -1.16 -2.04 
 (1.95) (2.23) (1.67) 
Mean log occupation wage 2.27*** 1.54*** 1.68** 
  (0.59) (0.49) (0.74) 
Source: 2002-2013 Current Population Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Estimates are 
from our preferred DDD model that includes the full set of state by year interactions. The first column 
replicates our results using our main analysis sample of adults with incomes of no more than 200% 
FPL. The second column includes observations up to 400% of FPL and the final column puts no income 
restriction on the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates for binary variables represent 
percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. Mean log occupation 
wage represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation 
category (from the IPUMS-CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any 
categories with fewer than 100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Medicaid Benefit Generosity and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Medicaid Adult 
Vision Benefits 
 
Michel Boudreaux and Brandy Lipton 
 
This appendix provides supplementary content not featured in the main paper. Our data and 
methods mirrors those in the main paper, except when noted. 
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This appendix extends the analysis shown in the main paper in several ways. Table 1 
provides the mean of each outcome considered in the paper by Medicaid and vision coverage 
status. These results enable calculation of regression estimated effects relative to the mean of 
interest, and also allow for comparison of regression-adjusted effects with unadjusted results. 
The final column of Appendix Table 1, “Unadjusted Difference-in-Difference,” computes the 
difference between each outcome for Medicaid enrollees with and without vision coverage 
relative to control group individuals with and without vision coverage. The results can be 
compared with the regression-based difference-in-difference and triple difference estimates 
provided in the main paper. While they do not have a causal interpretation, these unadjusted 
results are qualitatively similar to the findings from our regression analysis. 
Appendix Table 2 provides coefficient estimates for key explanatory variables included 
in our regression analysis. These results correspond with the triple difference analysis shown in 
Table 5 in the main paper. These estimates suggest that younger age, Hispanic ethnicity, 
unmarried status, male sex, higher educational attainment, and US citizenship are associated with 
a higher likelihood of employment. Among the employed, younger age, Hispanic ethnicity, 
married status, male sex, and having less than a high school diploma are associated with greater 
hours worked. Older age, married status, male sex, higher educational attainment, and US 
citizenship are associated with higher hourly wages and a higher mean log occupation wage. 
Appendix Table 3 compares our main triple difference estimates that use the one year lag 
of vision coverage policies to results where concurrent vision coverage policies are used instead. 
The estimates shown in the main paper use the one year lag of vision coverage policies in 
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regression analyses since we hypothesized that changes to vision coverage would first affect the 
likelihood of an eye doctor visit and receipt of a new prescription for eyeglasses before having an 
effect on employment outcomes. In line with our expectations, results are generally smaller in 
magnitude when concurrent vision coverage policies are used, though estimates are of the 
expected sign and key results maintain statistical significance in most instances. One exception is 
the mean log occupation wage, which is no longer statistically significant. The fact that 
switching occupations may take more time than increasing hours at a current job could, in part, 
explain this finding. 
Results in the main paper are based on the Census provided ASEC sample weight. 
Appendix Table 4 describes how sensitive our main results are to the use of these weights. This 
robustness test examines several potential problems with the Census provided weights.  
The ASEC weights are targeted to Census Population Estimates which are derived from 
counts obtained from the previous Decennial Census and are updated over time for migration, 
births, and deaths. When a new Decennial Census becomes available, the Population Estimates 
are re-calibrated to the new Census counts. As a result, the sum of the ASEC weights are not 
smooth over time, but shift abruptly when the re-calibrated Population Estimates are 
incorporated into the weighting routine. Additionally, because the ASEC is a voluntary 
supplement to the main monthly CPS, a number of eligible monthly CPS interviews refuse the 
supplement. The Census Bureau fully imputes the supplement data for these missing ASEC 
interviews and includes them in the public use file. However, due to previously described 
misspecifications in the imputation routine the inclusion of these fully imputed cases causes 
biases in estimates of health insurance and income. A fuller description of these issues is 
available in Ziengenfuss and Davern (2011) and Gouskova (2015). 
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In Appendix Table 4, we describe how our results vary across three alternative weights. 
Model 1 repeats results from the main paper using the Census provided ASEC weight. Model 2 
uses an alternative weight that is applied only to the sample that has not been fully imputed. The 
weight, produced by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center, has been inflated so that 
the restricted sample is representative of the full population and it has been smoothed over time 
to account for the re-calibration of the control totals. Model 3 presents unweighted results. While 
there are some minor differences, these results are fairly consistent and do not call into question 
our substantive conclusions.  
To test whether our main findings might be driven by the Great Recession, Appendix 
Table 5 compares our main results to estimates using a sample period that ends in calendar year 
2007. As described in more detail in the paper, the results of this analysis are fairly consistent 
with our main findings and suggest that changes to the US economy during the recession and 
recovery period are unlikely to explain our results.    
Appendix Table 6 provides results by age and marital status and extends the subgroup 
analysis shown in Table 7 in the main paper. There are two significant findings. Compared to 
married individuals, unmarried individuals experience a significantly larger effect to 
employment (yes/no). However, the effect of vision coverage for unmarried individuals is not 
statistically different from zero. Unmarried individuals, compared to their married counterparts, 
receive substantially less effect on part-time work (vs. full time or no work). There are no 
significant differences across the two age bands we consider (less than 35 versus 35 or older). 
Finally, Appendix Table 7 estimates “intent-to-treat” effects for two samples more likely 
to be eligible for Medicaid: adults with less than a high school degree, and adults with family 
incomes up to 400 percent FPL. The results for these two samples are expectedly weaker and 
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smaller in magnitude than our main results, as only about 10-13 percent of these individuals 
reported enrollment in Medicaid during the reference calendar year. However, we find evidence 
of significant impacts of vision benefits on intensive margin measures including usual hours 
worked, full-time status, and the mean log occupation wage. As expected, these results are 
completely concentrated among individuals who reported enrollment in Medicaid.  
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Appendix Table 1. Outcome Means for Medicaid Enrollees and Control Group Individuals, with and without Medicaid Adult 
Vision Coveragea 
                    
 Medicaid Enrollees  Control Group  
 
With vision 
coverage 
Without 
vision 
coverage Difference  
With 
vision 
coverage   
Without 
vision 
coverage Difference 
Unadjusted  
Difference-in-
Differenceb 
Full sample          
Worked at least one week 
last year 50.63 48.09 2.55*  67.79  66.65 1.14 1.41 
 (1.15) (0.94) (1.50)  (0.61)  (0.56) (0.76) (1.36) 
Usually worked full time 
last year (vs. part time or no 
work) 31.32 28.30 3.01***  50.61  50.43 0.17 2.84** 
 (0.70) (0.84) (1.07)  (0.58)  (0.71) (0.67) (1.13) 
Usually worked part time 
last year (vs. full time or no 
work) 19.31 19.78 -0.47  17.19  16.22 0.97 -1.43 
 (1.09) (0.60) (1.25)  (0.51)  (0.53) (0.64) (0.89) 
Employed last year          
Usual hours worked last 
year   34.00 33.36 0.64  36.86  37.11 -0.25 0.89** 
 (0.28) (0.30) (0.44)  (0.17)  (0.18) (0.18) (0.38) 
Usually worked full time 
last year (vs. part time) 61.85 58.86 2.99  74.64  75.66 -1.02 4.01*** 
 (1.54) (1.11) (1.88)  (0.68)  (0.79) (0.83) (1.48) 
Hourly wage last year       
(1999 dollars) 8.61 8.41 0.20  9.36  8.82 0.54** -0.34 
  (0.24) (0.28) (0.36)   (0.18)   (0.11) (0.22) (0.38) 
a All estimates represent mean values. Estimates use sampling weights and errors are clustered by state. Standard errors are in parentheses below estimates. The sample 
includes 48,020 adults who were on Medicaid at some point during the past year and 267,734 low-income adults not on Medicaid in the past year. * p<0.10, ** p <0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
b 
Estimates represent the difference between the third and sixth column. 
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Appendix Table 2. Coefficient Estimates for Key Explanatory Variables, Triple Difference Specificationa 
 Outcomes 
 Full sample Employed last year 
 
Worked at least 
one week last 
year 
Usually worked 
full time last 
year 
Usually worked 
part time last 
year 
Usual hours 
worked last 
year (log) 
Usually 
worked full 
time  
Hourly wage 
last year (log) 
Mean log 
occupation 
wage 
Explanatory variable        
Medicaid x vision 
benefits 1.44 3.60*** -2.16* 5.90*** 5.63*** -1.06 2.27*** 
 (1.76) (0.80) (1.29) (1.36) (1.07) (1.95) (0.59) 
Age -0.51*** -0.37*** -0.14*** -0.05*** -0.00 0.16*** 0.08*** 
 (0.39) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.84 3.82*** -2.99*** 4.01*** 5.55*** 0.05 -6.95*** 
 (0.88) (0.67) (0.39) (0.35) (0.44) (0.59) (0.37) 
Hispanic 5.65*** 8.88*** -3.22*** 4.76*** 7.03*** -0.36 -5.98*** 
 (0.56) (0.74) (0.42) (0.54) (0.80) (0.88) (0.51) 
Other race, non-Hispanic -3.76*** -1.20* -2.56*** 2.51*** 2.30*** -0.60 -3.25*** 
 (0.64) (0.62) (0.49) (0.73) (0.74) (0.88) (0.94) 
Married -2.79*** 1.17* -3.96*** 2.64*** 3.73*** 11.80*** 4.95*** 
 (0.58) (0.64) (0.24) (0.51) (0.48) (0.41) (0.30) 
Male 13.03*** 19.37*** -6.34*** 13.68*** 14.13*** 8.17*** 14.53*** 
 (1.54) (1.30) (0.39) (0.51) (0.40) (0.50) (0.34) 
Less than high school 
diploma -4.93*** -0.34 -4.60*** 3.35*** 4.24*** -14.71*** -19.78*** 
 (0.88) (0.96) (0.39) (0.73) (0.72) (0.52) (0.45) 
High school diploma or 
GED -0.32 4.17*** -4.49*** 5.59*** 6.29*** -8.75*** -14.59*** 
 (0.48) (0.29) (0.35) (0.39) (0.39) (0.35) (0.36) 
US citizen 1.44** 0.55 0.89*** 0.14 0.04 7.12*** 7.11*** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.17) (0.31) (0.35) (0.93) (0.50) 
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a The sample includes 48,020 adults who were on Medicaid at some point during the past year and 267,734 low-income adults not on Medicaid in the past year. All 
regression results were estimated using linear probability models or linear regression of logged outcomes that controlled for age, race/ethnicity, sex, Medicaid status, 
marital status, education, citizenship status, state and year fixed effects as well as interactions between Medicaid status and state, Medicaid status and year, and state and 
year. The coefficient estimates for state and year fixed effects and interactions between Medicaid status and state, Medicaid status and year, and state and year are omitted 
for brevity. Survey weights were used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. Estimates for binary variables (worked at 
least one week last year, usually worked full time, usually worked part time) represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. 
The "Mean log occupation wage" represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category (from CPS variable occ1990) 
excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 observations. Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Appendix Table 3. Triple Difference Results using a Concurrent Vision         
Coverage Indicatora 
 
Full sample     
Worked at least one week last year  1.44  0.78 
  (1.76)  (1.65) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work)  3.60***  1.86*** 
  (0.80)  (0.66) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work)  -2.16*  -1.08 
  (1.29)  (1.38) 
Employed last year     
Usual hours worked last year (log)     5.90***  3.66** 
  (1.37)  (1.56) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time)  5.63***  3.27** 
  (1.07)  (1.26) 
Hourly wage last year (log)  -1.06  -1.65 
  (1.95)  (1.71) 
Mean log occupation wage  2.27***  0.60 
    (0.59)   (0.94) 
     
Vision coverage variable   
One year 
lag   Concurrent 
 
a Estimates reported in the table represent the coefficient for the interaction between the vision coverage indicator and 
Medicaid status. Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses. All regression results were estimated using linear 
probability models or linear regression of logged outcomes that controlled for age, race/ethnicity, sex, Medicaid status, 
marital status, education, citizenship status, state and year fixed effects as well as interactions between Medicaid status and 
state, Medicaid status and year, and state and year. Survey weights were used to produce nationally representative estimates 
and errors were clustered at the state level. Estimates for binary variables (worked at least one week last year, usually worked 
full time, usually worked part time) represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log 
points. The "Mean log occupation wage" represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by 
occupation category (from CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 
100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix Table 4. Triple Difference Results using Alternative Weights and Unweighted Dataa  
    Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 
Full sample      
Worked at least one week last year  1.44  0.67 0.81 
  (1.76)  (1.89) (1.45) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work)  3.60***  3.17*** 3.22*** 
  (0.80)  (0.82) (0.69) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work)  -2.16*  -2.50* -2.41** 
  (1.29)  (1.44) (1.02) 
Employed last year      
Usual hours worked last year (log)     5.90***  5.83*** 5.71*** 
  (1.37)  (1.47) (1.08) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time)  5.63***  5.59*** 5.42*** 
  (1.07)  (1.22) (0.99) 
Hourly wage last year (log)  -1.06  -1.27 -1.89 
  (1.95)  (2.31) (1.84) 
Mean log occupation wage  2.27***  2.49*** 1.94** 
  (0.59)  (0.63) (0.74) 
      
Weight variable  standard  alternative none 
            
 
a Estimates reported in the table represent the coefficient for the interaction between the vision coverage indicator and 
Medicaid status. Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses. All regression results were estimated using linear 
probability models or linear regression of logged outcomes that controlled for age, race/ethnicity, sex, Medicaid status, 
marital status, education, citizenship status, state and year fixed effects as well as interactions between Medicaid status and 
state, Medicaid status and year, and state and year. Weights are as indicated in the table and errors were clustered at the state 
level. Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log 
points. The "Mean log occupation wage" represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by 
occupation category (from CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 
100 observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix Table 5. Triple Difference Results using Data Prior to the Great  
Recessiona 
 
Full sample     
Worked at least one week last year  1.44  -0.01 
  (1.76)  (2.35) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work)  3.60***  2.16* 
  (0.80)  (1.23) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work)  -2.16*  -2.17 
  (1.29)  (1.74) 
Employed last year     
Usual hours worked last year (log)     5.90***  4.50** 
  (1.37)  (2.20) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time)  5.63***  3.99** 
  (1.07)  (1.90) 
Hourly wage last year (log)  -1.06  7.03*** 
  (1.95)  (1.81) 
Mean log occupation wage  2.27***  3.05* 
    (0.59)   (1.69) 
     
Sample Period   2001-2012   2001-2007 
 
a
 Estimates reported in the table represent the coefficient for the interaction between the vision coverage indicator 
and Medicaid status. Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses. All regression results were 
estimated using linear probability models or linear regression of logged outcomes that controlled for age, 
race/ethnicity, sex, Medicaid status, marital status, education, citizenship status, state and year fixed effects as well 
as interactions between Medicaid status and state, Medicaid status and year, and state and year. Survey weights were 
used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. Estimates for binary 
variables represent percentage point effects. Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. The "Mean log 
occupation wage" represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation 
category (from CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 
100 observations.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 6. Triple Difference Results by Age and Marital Status  
 
  Under age 35 At least age 35 
p-value for 
difference Married Unmarried 
p-value for 
difference 
Full sample         
Worked at least one week last year 1.38 1.54 0.90 -0.81 3.33 0.02 
 (1.74) (1.87)  (1.91) (2.26)  
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work) 3.51* 3.63*** 0.97 2.76** 4.07*** 0.50 
 (2.02) (1.21)  (1.25) (1.35)  
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work) -2.13 -2.08* 0.98 -3.58*** -0.74 0.05 
 (2.13) (1.17)  (0.93) (1.72)  
Employed last year       
Usual hours worked last year (log)    5.87** 5.71** 0.96 6.51*** 5.00*** 0.41 
 (2.58) (2.43)  (1.28) (1.75)  
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time) 5.49 5.76*** 0.95 6.38*** 4.01* 0.39 
 (3.31) (1.59)  (0.79) (2.25)  
Hourly wage last year (log) -2.20 0.42 0.42 -3.84** 3.40 0.13 
 (2.02) (2.92)  (1.84) (3.92)  
Mean log occupation wage 3.69** 1.29* 0.21 3.98*** 1.45 0.17 
 (1.41) (0.76)   (1.11) (1.20)  
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a Estimates reported in the table represent the triple difference estimate from models with full interactions between the subgroup characteristic of interest 
and all explanatory variables. Standard errors are shown below estimates in parentheses. All regression results were estimated using linear probability 
models or linear regression of logged outcomes that controlled for age, race/ethnicity, sex, Medicaid status, marital status, education, citizenship status, state 
and year fixed effects as well as interactions between Medicaid status and state, Medicaid status and year, and state and year. Survey weights were used to 
produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. Estimates for binary variables represent percentage point effects. 
Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. The "Mean log occupation wage" represents the mean of the log wage for the full non-elderly adult 
CPS sample by occupation category (from CPS variable occ1990) excluding farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 
observations. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix Table 7. Intent-to-Treat Analysisa 
Full sample     
Worked at least one week last year  -0.32  0.36 
  (1.33)  (0.34) 
Usually worked full time last year                             
(vs. part time or no work)  0.33  0.99** 
  (1.09)  (0.50) 
Usually worked part time last year                               
(vs. full time or no work)  -0.65  -0.64 
  (0.51)  (0.47) 
Employed last year     
Usual hours worked last year (log)     0.79**  0.66 
  (0.38)  (0.59) 
Usually worked full time last year                                       
(vs. part time)  0.91*  1.08* 
  (0.50)  (0.62) 
Hourly wage last year (log)  -0.39  0.48 
  (1.03)  (0.47) 
Mean log occupation wage  0.75**  0.28* 
  (0.32)  (1.62) 
     
Sample   
Less than high 
school education   
Family income less 
than 400 FPL 
 
a Source: 2002-2013 CPS ASEC. The sample includes adults ages 22-64 who were not on Medicare and did not receive SSI 
income in the past year; other sample exclusions are as indicated. All regression results were estimated using linear 
probability models that controlled for age, race/ethnicity, sex, marital status, education, citizenship status, state and year fixed 
effects. Survey weights were used to produce nationally representative estimates and errors were clustered at the state level. 
The table shows the coefficient estimates on the vision coverage indicator. Standard errors are shown below estimates in 
parentheses.  Estimates for binary variables (employed last week, worked at least one week last year, usually worked full 
time, usually worked part time, service occupation, managerial/professional occupation) represent percentage point effects. 
Estimates for logged variables are in terms of log points. The "Mean log occupation wage" represents the mean of the log 
wage for the full non-elderly adult CPS sample by occupation category (from CPS variable occ1990) excluding 
farming/fishing occupations and any categories with fewer than 100 observations.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
 
 
